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Abstract
Background: The limited number of existing previous studies of the distribution of quality under NHS Pay-for-
performance (P4P) by income deprivation have not analysed the relationship at the individual level and have been
restricted to assessing P4P in the primary care setting. In this study, we set out to examine how achievement of
P4P 'quality measures' for which NHS hospitals were paid was distributed by income deprivation.
Methods: Design: Retrospective analysis of performance data reported by hospitals, examining how the probability
of receiving 23 indicators varied by patients’ area deprivation using logistic regression controlling for age and
gender. Sample: We use anonymised observational data on 73,002 patients admitted to hospitals in the North West
of England between October 2008 and March 2010 for the following five reasons: acute myocardial infarction;
coronary artery bypass grafting; heart failure; hip and knee replacement; and pneumonia.
Results: The relationship between quality and deprivation varies depending on the point of delivery in the
treatment pathway, and on whether delivered for conditions in scheduled or unscheduled care. For diagnostic tests
on arrival, receipt of quality was: pro-rich in scheduled care and pro-poor in unscheduled care. Receipt of quality
was pro-poor for pre-surgery measures in scheduled care. Receipt of quality at discharge was pro-rich.
Conclusion: Unlike in primary care, in secondary care quality is not systemically distributed by income deprivation
under P4P. Whilst improvements in health inequalities are important system objectives; they may not necessarily be
achieved by the adoption of P4P schemes in hospitals.
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Background
Various ‘pay-for-performance’ (P4P) initiatives have been
adopted in health care across the world. Typically, the
primary objective of these initiatives is to improve the
quality of care provided to patients and thus improve health
outcomes. Prior to 2008, experiments with P4P in the Na-
tional Health Service (NHS) in England have been limited
to a single scheme which was adopted in the primary care
setting: the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF).
Generally, studies evaluating the impact of P4P schemes
have focused on the quality of care provided under P4P
[1–6]. In addition, there are a limited number of analyses
of the impact on health outcomes [7–9]. A recent
Cochrane review found no evidence that financial in-
centives improve health outcomes [10]. Comparatively
limited evidence exists in relation to the impact of
P4P on the distribution of quality [11]. Many health
care systems state the reduction of health inequalities
as a policy objective [12] and so the potential distri-
butional impacts of P4P schemes are an important
consideration for policymakers.
Whilst the majority of the P4P literature focuses on
the relationship between P4P and quality of care, previ-
ous studies also exist which have considered the distri-
bution of quality under P4P. A recent systematic review
of the link between P4P and equity [11] found 22* Correspondence: thomas.mason@manchester.ac.uk
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relevant articles, noting that whilst the international
‘distributional’ evidence base is limited, a growing
evidence-base exists on the distribution of quality under
P4P in the primary care setting in the English NHS [13–
19]. These studies comprise observational analyses of
the QOF scheme which was introduced in 2004 in the
NHS and rewarded providers of primary care services
for achievement on a large number of quality indicators.
The majority of these studies focused on the relationship
between receipt of quality indicators and area deprivation,
with a consensus of studies finding a significant relation-
ship between relatively higher deprivation and a lower
probability of receiving quality – the gap narrowed over
time [16] but there is no evidence that the QOF reduced
health inequalities [20].
In this paper, we provide the first analysis of the distri-
bution of quality under P4P in NHS secondary care.
Equity under P4P may be different in the secondary care
setting: patients are more likely to be in seriously-ill
health and communication between the patient and the
health care professional is relatively brief (compared to
primary care). This analysis will allow us to provide de-
tails as to what is the current distribution of care quality
provided under P4P in a hospital setting.
We use data from the first P4P scheme introduced in
hospitals in England. We use, unlike many studies, data at
the level of the individual and our dataset contains
349,862 observations on 73,002 individuals.
The incentive scheme
The Advancing Quality (AQ) initiative was the P4P
scheme adopted in secondary care for the NHS - it was
introduced in October 2008 in all 24 NHS hospitals in
the North West of England that provide emergency care.
We provide details on the characteristics of these hospi-
tals in Table 1. The participating hospitals were required
to collect and submit data on 23 indicators relating to
five health conditions in total – two in scheduled care:
hip and knee replacement (HK) and coronary artery by-
pass grafting (CABG). We have data on three conditions
in unscheduled care: acute myocardial infarction (AMI);
pneumonia (PN) and heart failure (HF).
Financial rewards were based on the relative perform-
ance of the participants. At the end of the first year, par-
ticipants whose performance was in the top quartile for
each health condition received a bonus payment equal
to four percent of the revenue they receive for the patient
activity for this condition. The next-best performing quar-
tile received bonus payment equal to two percent of rev-
enue. The remaining participants did not receive bonus
payments. There were no penalties for relatively poor per-
formance. The total value of bonuses paid to participating
hospitals in the first year was £3.2 million.
When AQ was first introduced, Chief Executive Officers
(CEOs) of hospitals collectively decided to assign bonuses
to the clinical teams responsible for earning them. These
payments could not be taken as personal income; instead
they would be reinvested into improving clinical quality.
Methods
The rationale for adopting P4P is that it changes the be-
haviour of providers. Providers might be motivated to
exert greater effort for tasks that can be completed at
the lowest effort and financial cost in order to maximise
the gap between revenue and costs [21]. This may mean
that, under P4P, providers select types of tasks and/or
patients for with a higher expected revenue-cost differ-
ential: such as patients from less deprived backgrounds
who typically have fewer co-morbidities and are there-
fore simpler/less costly to treat [22].
Conversely, it may be that providers do not target ‘simpler’
patients, but that P4P induces providers to treat more com-
plicated patients who might be neglected in its absence [16].
We obtained a unique patient level dataset from the
North West Advancing Quality team. This dataset is an
extract from Secondary Uses Service (SUS) of AQ quali-
fying patients using ICD10 codes (International Classifi-
cation of Diseases version 10) and procedure codes.
These data cover the time period October 2008 to
Table 1 Characteristics of participating hospitals
Characteristic Number Percentage
Scale and scope of hospital
Teaching or specialist 5 21
Large general 7 29
Medium general 8 33
Small general 4 17
Foundation Trust Status a
Non-foundation Trust 17 71
Foundation Trust 7 29
Rating of overall quality of care in 2007b
Excellent 7 29
Good 13 54
Fair or weak 4 17
Rating of financial management in 2007c
Excellent 11 46
Good 7 29
Fair or weak 6 25
aFoundation trust hospitals that have been approved by the national regulator to
have additional managerial and financial autonomy; classified according to status
in 2007
bThe rating represent the composite rating of performance in 2007 by the
national regulator (the Healthcare Commission) against core standards,
existing national targets, and new national targets for quality
cThe rating represents the composite rating of performance in 2007 by the
national regulators (the Healthcare Commission and Monitor) on financial
standing, management, and control
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March 2010. The data are merged at an individual level
with the Quality Measures Reporter (QMR) which con-
tains the information entered by the provider on pa-
tients’ receipt of clinical process measures.
We also use the income deprivation score extracted
from The English Indices of Deprivation 2010. The index
of income deprivation (IMD 2010) is a lower level super
output area (LSOA) measure of income deprivation. We
have 4749 LSOAs in our sample, and on average there are
15 individuals in each LSOA. This measure of income
deprivation reflects the proportion of the LSOA popula-
tion in receipt of state benefits and tax credits on
grounds of low income (IMD 2010). Patients are assigned
a deprivation score based on their area of residence. The
mean deprivation score in our sample is 0.182 and the
standard deviation is 0.133 (i.e. on average in our sample,
18.2 % of each LSOA population is in receipt of state ben-
efits and tax credits on grounds of low income; and the
average deviation around the mean is 13.3 %).
Our data contain 349,862 observations on 73,002 pa-
tients for five conditions: 11,889 AMI patients; 2989
CABG patients; 10,791 HF patients; 21,436 HK patients
and 25,897 PN patients.
We model the probability that an individual received a
quality indicator based on their LSOA using logistic re-
gression, standardising for age and gender.
Results
We present the Marginal Effects (ME) of a change in
LSOA on individuals’ probability of receipt of quality
measures (Tables 2 and 3). The MEs show the change in
a patient’s probability of receipt of an indicator for resid-
ing in an area with an additional 10 % of the population
in receipt of social security payments on the basis of low
income. When referring to ‘poorer’ patients (below), we
mean patients residing in an area with an additional
10 % of the population in receipt of social security pay-
ments on the basis of low income.
In scheduled care, we found statistically significant rela-
tionships for three out of nine indicators. Poorer patients
were found to have a higher probability of receiving pre-
surgical interventions for both hip and knee replacements
and coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) (Table 2). A
statistically significant relationship with income deprivation
exists for two of these pre-surgical measures: being ‘poorer’
increased patients’ probabilities of having venous thrombo-
embolism prophylaxis (VTE) ordered by 0.4 % (p < 0.05);
and increased patients’ probabilities of receiving prophy-
laxis within 24 h of surgery by 1.2 % (p < 0.01).
Diagnostic testing on arrival prior to scheduled proce-
dures was ‘pro-rich’. For hip and knee replacement, the
probability of being given the diagnostic test for prophylac-
tic antibiotic selection was 0.8 % lower (p < 0.01) for poorer
patients. The relationship was also negative (0.06 %; p > 0.1)
for the same diagnostic testing for CABG patients.
For our three conditions in unscheduled care we found
significant relationships with income deprivation for four
out of 14 indicators. In the case of AMI, the probability of
receiving smoking cessation advice on or prior to dis-
charge from hospital was 1.52 % lower for poorer patients
(p < 0.05). For a similar discharge indicator for heart fail-
ure patients (giving specific discharge instructions) we
found a comparable effect both in the direction and mag-
nitude of the effect: poorer patients’ probabilities of re-
ceiving discharge advice were 1.53 % lower (p < 0.01).
We found two further significant relationships for pneu-
monia patients – both for quality indicators which represent
diagnostic tests carried out for patients on arrival at hospital.
Poorer patients had a 0.59 % higher (p < 0.1) probability of
receiving a diagnostic test for antibiotic selection and had a
1.03 % higher (p < 0.1) probability of having blood taken in
accident and emergency prior to the receipt of antibiotics.
Discussion
This study provides the first analysis of P4P on distribu-
tion of health care in hospitals situated in a public system
with universal coverage. We utilize hitherto unexploited
Table 2 Effect of deprivation status on the probability of receiving quality indicators (Scheduled Care)
Pathway point Condition Scheduled care: indicator definition Marginal Effect (ME) Std. Error
Arrival (Test) HK Prophylactic antibiotic selection for surgical patients −0.0879*** −0.0198
Arrival (Test) CABG Prophylactic antibiotic selection for surgical patients −0.0554 −0.029
Pre-surgery HK Prophylactic antibiotic less than 1 h prior to surgical incision 0.0244 −0.0199
Pre-surgery CABG Prophylactic antibiotic less than 1 h prior to incision 0.0173 −0.0276
Pre-surgery HK Recommended venous thromboembolism prophylaxis ordered 0.0401** −0.0137
Pre-surgery HK VTE Prophylaxis under 24 h pre- or post-surgery 0.1226*** −0.0171
Post-surgery HK Prophylactic antiobiotics discontinued under 24 h post-surgery −0.0169 −0.0125
Post-surgery CABG Prophylactic antiobiotics discontinued under 24 h post-surgery −0.01 −0.0339
Discharge CABG Aspirin prescribed at discharge −0.0271 −0.0279
(The MEs show the change in a patient’s probability of receipt of an indicator for residing in an area with an additional 10 % of the population in receipt of social
security payments on the basis of low income); *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; *p < 0.05
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cross-sectional, patient-level data and control for covari-
ates such as age and gender.
Whilst the QOF literature suggests that, under P4P, the
distribution of quality was skewed towards richer patients
in the primary care setting, the results in this study are
equivocal when taken at face value. There is no evidence of
a systematic relationship across all of the quality indicators.
However, we found that pre-surgical measures in sched-
uled care were more likely to be received by patients from
areas of lower income deprivation. We also found a ‘pro-
poor bias’ for two diagnostic tests on arrival in pneumonia
patients. Conversely, we found that testing on arrival for
hip and knee patients was significantly ‘pro-rich’ for one
indicator (prophylactic antibiotic selection).
For many of our indicators, we did not find a statistically
significant result. This may suggest that, in these cases,
there was no relationship between income deprivation
and the probability of the receipt of quality. It may also be
the case that receipt of certain indicators is driven more
extensively by exogenous factors beyond the control of
providers/health professionals than for others.
The evidence base from the previous P4P initiative
adopted in the NHS (the QOF) suggests that, under P4P,
quality was distributed towards patients from richer areas,
but that the ‘pro-rich’ bias narrowed over time. However,
such a scheme had not been adopted in the secondary
care setting in the NHS prior to the AQ initiative. Policy-
makers’ interest in P4P lies both in its capacity to improve
the quality of care delivered; and its impact on wider sys-
tem objectives such as the reduction of health inequalities.
In light of this, it is also important to understand the
differential distributional impact P4P can have in the alter-
native settings of primary care and hospitals.
This study is subject to some (but not all) of the same
limitations as the general P4P evidence base. We have
no pre-AQ data and this means we only observe the dis-
tribution under the P4P scheme – we cannot compare
pre-intervention with post-intervention.
We found that pre-surgical measures in scheduled care
were more likely to be received by patients from areas of
lower income deprivation. This may be the consequence of
the strategic targeting of preventative pre-surgical measures:
poorer patients are typically higher risk, and these measures
are conventionally targeted at higher risk groups. The
results for ‘testing on arrival’ measures were divergent: pro-
poor in unscheduled care (where processes are typically per-
formed more hastily), and pro-rich in scheduled care.
Conclusions
The results of our study diverge from the QOF literature as
we find that the distribution of quality under P4P was not
systematically skewed across income deprivation. Instead, it
may be that our findings suggest that the distribution of
quality under P4P depends crucially on the context –
whether in primary or secondary care; varying depending on
the point in the treatment pathway; and depending on the
extent to which the receipt of the indicator is determined by
exogenous factors beyond the control of providers. Never-
theless, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding
P4P schemes effects on equity; further research is required.
But policymakers may still wish to be cautious when consid-
ering adopting and designing P4P schemes as their effects
Table 3 Effect of deprivation status on the probability of receiving quality indicators (Unscheduled Care)
Pathway point Condition Unscheduled care: indicator definition Marginal effect (ME) Std. Error
Arrival (Test) HF Evaluation of LVS Function 0.009 −0.0262
Arrival (Test) PN Initial antibiotic selection for CAP in immunocompetent patients 0.0593* −0.029
Arrival (Test) PN Blood cultures in A&E before antibiotic administration 0.1027* −0.0507
Arrival (Prevention) AMI Aspirin at arrival 0.0018 −0.0144
Arrival (Prevention) AMI Fibrinolytic Therapy within 30 min of arrival 0.0184 −0.0954
Arrival (Prevention) PN Initial antibiotic within 6 h of arrival −0.049 −0.0332
Discharge AMI Adult smoking cessation advice −0.1521** −0.0561
Discharge HF Discharge instructions −0.1530*** −0.0394
Discharge HF Adult smoking cessation advice −0.0849 −0.1154
Discharge PN Adult smoking cessation advice −0.1002 −0.0554
Discharge AMI Aspirin prescribed at discharge 0.0066 −0.0124
Discharge AMI ACEI or ARB for LVSD 0.026 −0.0326
Discharge HF ACEI or ARB for LVSD −0.0086 −0.0395
Discharge AMI Beta blocker prescribed at discharge −0.0026 −0.0237
(The MEs show the change in a patient’s probability of receipt of an indicator for residing in an area with an additional 10 % of the population in receipt of social
security payments on the basis of low income); *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; *p < 0.05
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are unpredictable, the evidence base is ambiguous and their
effects may be in direct contradiction to health system
objectives: health equity is an important system objective
that may necessarily not be achieved by payment-for-
performance. Policymakers may also wish to heed to follow-
ing advice: when it comes to P4P schemes and their unpre-
dictable distributional impacts, the devil is in the detail.
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